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THE PROFESSIONS AND NONCOMMERCIAL
PURPOSES: APPLICABILITY OF PER SE RULES
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 1
invalidating a bar association's minimum fee schedules as an illegal pricefixing arrangement, it was generally thought that the so-called learned
professions were exempt from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 2 With
the Court's sharp rejection of this view, it is clear that the associations
established for professional self-regulation are answerable for violations
of the antitrust laws. 3 Yet to be resolved is whether the professions are to

421 U.S. 773, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1970), proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States .... " Besides the requirements that the activity affect
"trade or commerce," the Act also requires that the challenged restraint involve interstate
commerce. See note 3 infra.
3
Notwithstanding Goldfarb, significant areas of conduct by professions may still be
exempt from Sherman Act prohibitions. Litigation has focused most frequently upon the
following areas:
State Action. Goldfarb held that there could be no exemption for the bar association's fee
schedules on grounds of state action, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), but the
opinion left undecided whether other professional activities might be held exempt on those
grounds. In Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the state action exemption was
held to apply to the state bar's rule against advertising, since the Arizona State Supreme
Court compelled members of the bar to observe the rule. On the state action exemption and
recent limitations upon it, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Surety
Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 19TI), vacated
[1978-1) TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,406 (4th Cir. 1978); City of Fairfax, Va. v. Fairfax Hosp.
Ass'n, [1976-2) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,I 60,999 (E.D. Va. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3658 (Apr. 24, 1978).
Noerr-Pennington. Another recognized exemption to the Sherman Act exists for activities
that seek a legislative response to particular business or professional concerns. See United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co.,
560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3420 (1978). But see Mountain Grove
Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co. of Bridgeport, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 951 (D. Conn. 1977)
("sham exception").
Intrastate Commerce. Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act requires that the alleged
anticompetitive conduct affect "commerce among the several States," see note 2 supra.
Consequently, activities that touch only upon intrastate commerce will be exempted. See,
e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
Antitrust enforcement pertaining to the professions has been expanding under the parallel
provisions of§ 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). See, e.g., In re American Dental
Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,255 (complaint issued Jan. 4, 19TI); In re American
Medical Ass'n, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,068 (complaint
issued Dec. 19, 1975). See also [1978) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 844 at
A-14 (FTC opens industry wide probe of restrictions on legal services); [1977) ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 812 at A-15 (FTC official predicts expansion of antitrust
1

2
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be judged by the same antitrust standards as those applied to the conduct
of profitmaking business entities.
Under current antitrust standards, certain recurring business practices
have been deemed illegal per se under the Sherman Act. 4 However,
where a practice challenged under a per se rule is sufficiently germane to
some legitimate self-regulatory purpose-such as the establishment of
membership standards for private associations-per se concepts have
generally been displaced by the rule of reason. Especially in litigation
involving trade associations, the lack ofa competitive relationship and the
uniform operation of the particular restraint have removed the conduct
from per se treatment. In effect, the noncommercial purpose of the
particular restraint has caused it to fall outside the class of per se invalid
res traints. 5

efforts in health care area); [19n] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 802 at A-4
(FfC investigating alleged discrimination against psychologists by physician accreditation
group). Cf. In re American Dental Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,328 (Jan. 18, 1978)
(denying motion to dismiss complaint on grounds that FfC lacked jurisdiction over nonprofit organization).
The remedies provided under the Sherman, Clayton, and FfC Acts are not mutually
exclusive. Indeed, they are commonly regarded as providing a cumulative remedy. Sections
1-3 of the Sherman Act make violations punishable as felonies and provide for substantial
fines and imprisonment within the discretion of the court. Authority to institute criminal
proceedings is lodged in the Department of Justice. For an example of the stiff penalties
imposed, see United States v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 45,007 (D.
Conn. 1978), in which price-fixing convictions resulted in fines totalling over $800,000 and
sentences of up to 30 months. While the Justice Department's policy is to institute criminal
proceedings only for wilful violations, wilfulness will be presumed where a per se violation is
shown. See THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT, AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967). Asst. Attorney-General
Donald Baker has urged stiffer jail sentences for antitrust violators and has recommended a
flat 18 month sentence rule, with greater sentences in case of corporate recidivism. See N. Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at 27, col. I. The private treble damage remedy is authorized under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Damages include amounts passed on to consumers, see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). But see
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (19n) (recovery limited to direct purchasers).
• The classic statement of the per se theory is contained in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958):
[nhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonablean inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
For a discussion of the per se and rule of reason theories, see text accompanying notes 7-15
infra.
5
The many discussions dealing with the doctrine of noncommercial purpose have generally concluded that to be illegal, a combination must be formed for the purpose and with the
effect of restraining trade. See, e.g., Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws,
50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1975); Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act
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A profession is distinguishable from an ordinary commercial enterprise
because of its preeminently noncommercial purpose and its extensive
self-regulatory powers. The recent acceleration of antitrust litigation involving the professions has generated much confusion over the applicability of per se rules to professional defendants, particularly in the area of
group boycott. 6 Because a per se rule ordinarily eliminates the need for
the antitrust plaintiff to prove the unreasonableness of the conduct, a
defendant profession might be barred from introducing evidence of the
challenged practice's noncommercial purpose.
This article will examine the doctrine of noncommercial purpose in the
professional context and assess whether conduct undertaken by the professions conforms to the presumptions underlying the per se doctrine. It is
the thesis of this article that the per se doctrine should not preclude
inquiry into whether a valid noncommercial purpose justifies conduct
undertaken in good faith by a profession to regulate its membership or to
advance some other public interest. This article concludes that, with
respect to professions, the goals of the Sherman Act are better served by
inquiry into noncommercial purposes and application of the rule ofreason
than by rigid adherence to the per se doctrine.
I.

STANDARDS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT

The literal language of the Sherman Act prohibits all business practices
''in restraint of trade." Given that every business practice aims to restrain
trade, however, courts have traditionally applied a rule of reason in

Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962); Horsley, Per Se Il/ega/ity and Concerted Refusals to
Deal, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 484 (1972).
In United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng's, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. Im), aff' d, 46
U .S.L. W. 4356 (1978), the District of Columbia Circuit Court recognized the viability of the
doctrine of noncommercial purpose when "narrowly defined in terms of intended social
benefits." 555 F.2d at 983. As another court concludes, "this adoption of a 'commerciaV
noncommercial' activity dividing line is perhaps just an application of the 'Rule of Reason'."
United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507, 517 (D. Ore. 1974). That is, conduct
undertaken in good faith for a substantially noncommercial purpose arguably lacks the requisite anticompetitive purpose necessary for a Sherman Act violation.
6
This article concentrates primarily upon group boycott activity by the professions
because it is an area of intense legal activity concerning the doctrine of noncommercial
purpose. The case law confirms that there is simply no clear definition of a group boycott.
As one court has phrased it: "[l]o state that the law concerning group boycotts and Section
I of the Sherman Act lacks consistency would be to understate the truth by a wide margin."
Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of S. C., 436 F. Supp.
418, 429 (D.S.C. 1976), ajf d, 509 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978). As used in this discussion, the
term "group boycott" refers to collective conduct that is per se illegal under § I of the
Sherman Act. Collective action that is not a per se offense may still be anticompetitive and
illegal but is not a group boycott. A valid noncommercial purpose may remove the conduct
from the group boycott definition, because only group conduct that is clearly anticompetitive constitutes a group boycott. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
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judging anticompetitive practices under the Act. 7 Under the standard of
reasonableness, competing economic and social values can be proffered
to justify the challenged activity. One of the benefits of the rule of reason
is that it allows the court to consider economic and other evidence
probative of industry conditions that would be excluded under the per se
standard. Moreover, it arguably constitutes a closer approximation of the
competition policy of the Act because only conduct that has been subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny is ultimately condemned. 8 The costs,
of course, are those associated with any protracted undertaking: time and
·uncertainty. 9
The several per se rules were developed in response to the proliferation
of antitrust cases involving similar practices that had predictably been
proven unreasonable and therefore illegal. 10 In a sense, per se rules "play

7
Consider Judge Hand's commendation of the rule of reason in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. I (1945):
[A]s everyone now agrees ... restriction alone is not enough to stamp a combination as illegal; it must be "unreasonable" in the sense that the common law
understood that word; and that never has been, and indeed in the nature of things
never can be, defined in general terms. Courts must proceed step by step, applying
retroactively the standard proper for each situation as it comes up, just as they do
in the case of negligence, reasonable notice, and the like.
Id. at 368.
8
Thus in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis
pronounced that in determining the reasonableness of a particular restraint
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. at 238. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U,S. 253 (1963); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. l (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898). But see Professor Bork's attack upon the Brandeis formula in Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 782 (1965).
9
Consider, for instance, the· antitrust suit currently being litigated against IBM by the Justice Dept., a case that is not expected to be resolved until 1985. As of 1976, the Justice Department had already spent about $5 million on the case. An earlier suit brought by Control
Data Corp. against IBM, which was settled in 1973, involved discovery of over 30 million
documents and spawned Control Data's computer litigation service now subscribed to by a
number of large corporations. Perhaps the longest antitrust suit to date was brought by the
Government against El Paso Natural Gas Co. The Government finally won-16 years later.
An interesting statistical summary of another large antitrust case involving the nation's leading investment banking firms may be found in an appendix to Judge Medina's 200 page opinion in Morgan v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 621, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). As Judge Medina
concluded: "[l]n my judgment, the only hope of cutting these conspiracy cases down to size
lies in the exercise of a sound discretion by the Dept. of Justice." Id. at 827. See also
Kohlmeier, Antitrust Litigation: It's Big Business, N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 3, at 2, col.

3.
10
The Supreme Court recently commented upon the rationale of per se rules in a case that
put a stop to the much criticized per se treatment of vertical territorial restraints, specifically
overruling the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
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the percentages": per se conduct that is, in fact, reasonable is sufficiently
rare that the gains of a per se rule outweigh the cost of an occasional
unjustified result. Per se rules effectively shorten the process of judicial
inquiry in cases involving per se restraints; antitrust plaintiffs need not
prove the unreasonablness of the conduct once they show that it falls
within one of the per se categories. Per se rules are perceived as promoting values not only of judicial economy but also of certainty and
prophylaxsis. 11 Thus, the per se doctrine puts the business community on
notice that certain practices will not be tolerated.
Several recent decisions in the federal courts reflect continuing unease
with the per se doctrine, even in traditional areas of enforcement. 12 One
reason for this unease is the perceived value of certain restraints in
creating market efficiencies that might result in benefits to the consumer.13 Indeed, respected authorities argue that the courts have overreached both the Act's economic and social goals in propagating the

365 (1967):
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social
utility of particular commercial practices.- The probability that anticompetitive
consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences
must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit
the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases
are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense· necessary
to identify them.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (19TI). See also United
States v. Topco Assocs. 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972); United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
II
See, e.g., Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-commercial Concerted Refusals to
Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247, 282 (1970); Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints under
Schwinn and Sylvania, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 277 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977):
Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community
and to minimize the burden on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex
rule of reason trials ... but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to
justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be
reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesired rigidity in the
law.
Id. at 50 n.16. See also United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341
(1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir.
19TI), rehearing granted (Dec. 15, 1977); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co.,
437 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977); United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685, 690 n.9 (S.D.
Tex. 1975); 16J J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION § 76.02 [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI]; Robinson, Recent
Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 191, 226-35 (1976).
13
For example, restrictions on the business activities of business partners require those
partners to focus their efforts upon the partnership's business, and prevent nonproducing
partners from enjoying a free ride. Similarly, mergers might create certain management
efficiencies not otherwise possible where businesses operate independently. Among other
efficiencies made po_ssible by various vertical and horizontal restraints are stable relationships with resellers, larger scales of operations, reduction of selling costs, greater reseller
expertise, and more accurate estimation of output required. See Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429-65 (1966).
See also Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L. J. I
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various per se rules . 14 Similarly, it is argued that overzealous protection
of the small businessman is achieved at the cost of potentially higher
prices and less uniform merchantability of goods, among other effects. 15
Debate over the competition policy of the Sherman Act continues, and
there are compelling arguments against converting the Act into a strict
liability statute through expanded use of per se rules.
In spite of the need to use per se rules cautiously, many courts persist in
applying them to conduct that does not fit the traditional per se mold. Per
se rules reflect the courts' long experience with commercial antitrust
defendants who invariably share the same primary purpose: profitmaking.
This apparent predictability of purpose is not necessarily true in the
professional setting, where courts have recognized self-regulation-a
noncommercial purpose-as a legitimate justification for otherwise anticompetitive behavior. To facilitate discussion of the noncommercial purpose exception to per se illegality for the professions, it will be helpful to
reconsider Goldfarb and the learned profession exemption.

(1977); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Weston, Antitrust: The Coming Battlefield, Wall
St. J., Apr. 14, 1978, at 18, col. 3.
In the recently litigated suit brought by Beneey Photo against Eastman Kodak resulting in
one of the largest antitrust awards in history, the plaintiff successfully argued that because of
Kodak's monopoly of the camera business, Kodak's introduction of a new camera was
anticompetitive since only Kodak had the technology to process the film for the new
camera. Kodak defended on the ground that requiring Kodak to share its new technology
with competitors would undermine the free enterprise system. One commentator has agreed
that the decision against Kodak will not promote competition: corporations will be
discouraged from developing products because the costs advantage created by such new
technology will be lost. See Clearwaters, Better Mousetrap Builders, Beware, N. Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 1978:, § F, at 14, col. I. But see Wilson, Barriers to Trustbusting: "Efficiency"
Myths and Timid Trustbusters, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 19 (1977).
14
See Bork, supra note 13, at 474 in which Professor Bone criticizes
the tendency to oversimplify economic phenomena, to carry over rules of per se
illegality, proper in the cartel contexts in which they evolved, to situations in which
restriction of output was patently neither intended nor effected. This misuse of the
per se concept destroys efficiency and hence misallocates resources. The overextension of the per se concept by the courts thus has the same sort of effect upon
consumers as do cartel agreements.
See also Bone, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. OF LAW & EcoN. 7
(1966); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 334 (1968).
The purely social goals of the Sherman Act have been variously described as aimed at
stemming the tide towards cartelization, preserving democracy via the protection of competition in the maneetplace, and the like. Compare, e.g., AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ,r 121
(2d ed. 1974), with von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of
Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569, 591 (1964). See generally Symposium, Antitrust
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977).
10
See, e.g .. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 816 at A-12 (Economists
at FTC conference criticize increased antitrust efforts in health care).
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II. THE PROFESSIONS: NONCOMMERCIAL PuRPOSES AND MARKET IMPACT

A. Origins of the Professions' Special Status

The learned profession exemption 16 evolved long before the present era
of massive consumer reliance upon professional services. 17 In the few
reported antitrust cases involving professions, lower courts seldom articulated their reasons for exempting professional conduct from antitrust
scrutiny beyond formulaic expressions that the Sherman Act was ''tailored ... for the business world" 18 and that the professions were distinct
from the traditional class of antitrust defendants. This exemption came to
be understood as involving jurisdictional defects, principally a lack of
involvment with "trade or commerce. " 19 Goldfarb resolved the jurisdictional dispute by finding that legal services have a significant impact on
interstate commerce. For purposes offuture antitrust scrutiny, however,
the Court noted a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities of professions and specifically limited its consideration to the
issues presented by the defendant's minimum fee schedules. 20 Thus the
Court's finding of classic price-fixing in Goldfarb, a practice that would

18
The so-called learned profession exemption was judicially created, unlike the labor
exemption to the Sherman Act provided by§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §17 (1970), or
the agricultural exemption in§ I of the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970), and§ 5
of the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Although never directly
passed on by the Supreme Court until Goldfarb, the learned profession exemption was
recognized by many lower courts. See generally VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, at §
79.04, and cases cited therein.
17
As an example of the market power wielded by industries involving professional
services, the health industry has been said to be the third largest in the nation, accounting for
7. 7% of the current GNP and employing more than 4.5 million individuals. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, CoNTROLS ON HEALTH CARE: PAPERS OF THE CoNFERENCE ON REGULATION IN
THE HEAL TH INDUSTRY 6 (1974).
18
Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (holding that
exclusion of proprietary college from defendant association would be scrutinized under rule
of reason). See also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); In re
Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
19 See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Note, The Sherman Act and the Medical
Profession, 34 ILL. L. REv. 602 (1940).
•• The Court thus commented, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities and automatically apply to
the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public·
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation
than the one with which we are confronted today.
While it cannot be said categorically that the Court had the per se doctrine in mind when it
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normally invoke a per se rule, cannot be read as mandating the perfunctory application of per se rules to all self-regulatory activities undertaken by the professions. 21
B. Noncommercial Purposes
It has long been recognized that the professions differ fundamentally
from ordinary commercial businesses and, consequently, merit more
liberal treatment under the antitrust laws. 22 Courts have generally assumed that the professions exist for reasons in addition to the profit
motive. 23 The essence of the concept of "profession" is the power to
self-regulate and to promote standards of practice that benefit the public
at large as well as the individual practitioner. 24 Professional societies have
traditionally operated as clearinghouses for the exchange of ideas and
concerns among individual practitioners. Without this exchange, the impetus towards improved standards of practice and the dissemination of
practical information and new developments might otherwise grind to a
halt, and the profession would stagnate. Moreover, the sum of professionals acting in concert is greater than the sum of professionals individually; the power of numbers gives teeth to the ethical and social considerations that ultimately define professional practice. Of course there is equal
potential for mischief under such an alignment, 25 but the benefits of
higher standards, technological innovations, and greater appreciation of
consumer needs have been substantial.

referred to antitrust concepts, it at least appears that the issue of a per se versus rule of
reason standard was argued to the Court in Goldfarb. See 43 U.S.L.W. 3521 (1975). For an
interpretation of the Court's cryptic footnote, see Robinson, supra note 12.·See also Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).
21
See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 5, at 592.
22
The professions, like certain other regulated industries, are natural monopolies. Since
they contribute so substantially to the public welfare, it has been felt that trade restraints
which necessarily accompany this monopoly power should be given greater deference by the
courts. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258,
1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
23
In United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952), Justice
Jackson observed:
[T]here are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between
patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that
forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession.
See also Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935);
Northern ·ea1. Pharm. Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 862 (1962); Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. N.C.A.R.B., [1975-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH)
,r 60,108 (D.D.C. 1975); Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964).
24
See, e.g., Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E. 2d 292 (1963), cited by the Court in
Goldfarb, which held that the state bar was authorized by the Virginia State Bar Act to
promote reform in the law, to advance the science of jurisprudence, to facilitate the
administration of justice, and generally to uphold the public interest.
25
Consider, for example, the action taken by the Michigan Psychological Association
against a controversial psychologist who was accused of violating six of the association's
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C. Self-Regulation and Market Impact
Besides the noncommercial aspects of the professional network described above, there exists a complementary 26 self-regulatory aspect that
differentiates the professions from the customary antitrust defendant. A
professional society is ordinarily empowered, for example, to punish a
member's egregious conduct in order to maintain the integrity of the
profession and to assure consumers that its practitioners possess certain
minimum levels ofcompetence. 27 Moreover, the standards against which
an abuse is judged are often peculiarly within the expertise of the particular profession, making self-regulation more efficient than judicial enforcement. In this sense, per se rules overlook the burden that professional self-regulation has saved the courts. Internal control is less likely to
continue if courts automatically impose liability upon the professions for
good faith conduct taken in response to difficult questions of professional
standards.
The presence of pervasive self-regulatory powers can have important
consequences for market analysis of professional activities. First, restraints imposed by professional societies do not have the same impact
upon competitive relations among practitioners as ordinary business restraints. In the traditional commercial setting, competitors vie for a share
of the market, and ordinarily one person's gain is another person's loss. In
the professional setting, however, all members of a particular profession
voluntarily submit to the limitations imposed by that profession. An
individual practitioner does not vie with a professional society for a share
of the market in professional services; nor are ethical constraints or
standards of competency aimed at one practitioner, but at the profession
as a whole. Second, professional restraints do not necessarily have the
same effects upon consumers as ordinary business restraints. For example, one familiar area of conflict between professionals and consumers
concerns accreditation of professional schools. 28 By limiting access to a

rules of conduct. A private hearing was held to determine whether the psychologist should
have his license revoked. Specifically, it was alleged that he urged patients not to have
contact with friends, colleagues, or even family members, and encouraged them to become
excessively involved, both financially and personally, in therapy that often increased their
stress. The psychologist has denied wrongdoing in his group therapy practice and has
accused the association of ousting him after holding a kangaroo court. Detroit Free Press,
Dec. 2, 1977, at 120, col. I.
26
Certain noncommercial purposes of professions are not strictly self-regulatory. Thus, a
group of physicians who take action against an allegedly unsafe abortion clinic are arguably
more concerned with protecting the public welfare than satisfying their duty of selfregulation. For a discussion of the case from which the above facts are drawn, see text
accompanying notes 50-56 infra.
27
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.01 to .171 (1975 & West Supp. 1977), which
authorizes the formation of hospital review committees to oversee the medical practices and
standards of care being provided by hospitals.
28
See [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 802 at A-4 (FTC criticizes AMA
involvement in accreditation of medical schools); id. at No. 808 at A-6 (HEW advisory group
rejects FTC criticism of medical school accreditation committee).
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given profession, the national societies have clearly had an effect on the
market in qualified professionals. It is not clear, however, that these
actions are therefore anticompetitive, because accreditation is considered
essential to establish and maintain the standards of professionalism upon
which consumers rely. Indeed, creating greater access to professional
practice may result in such a vastly changed service "product" that
traditional understandings of market share and anticompetitive impact
would be rendered less than helpful, if not wholly useless. 29 In short, the
difficulty of applying traditional market analyses to activities of professional societies is exacerbated by the important self-regulatory functions
served by those societies.
Taken together, the professions' traditional exercise of extensive selfregulatory powers and the ambiguity of the economic effects of regulation
suggest that a cautious approach be taken under the antitrust laws. Since
the existence of an ostensible noncommercial purpose is essential to
avoid per se illegality for many self-regulatory activities, the pertinent
inquiry in determining the appropriate antitrust standard is to identify
those noncommercial purposes important enough to compete with the
substantial goals of the Sherman Act.
Ill.

NONCOMMERCIAL PuRPOSE AND THE PROFESSIONS:
A DEFENSE TO SHERMAN AcT CHALLENGE

A. Noncommercial Purpose in Nonprofessional Contexts

In areas other than the professions, courts do not apply rules of per se
illegality where the anticompetitive effect of group conduct is ancillary to
a primary noncommercial purpose rationally related to the character of
the particular defendant. In cases involving trade associations, for example, courts have condoned certain restraints in the nature of concerted
refusals to deal where the conduct implements a uniform rule or standard
whose restraining effect is universal. 30 The common thread in these

•• Proponents of greater access to professional training dispute the claim that such access
results in greater incompetency, arguing that market forces will weed out the incompetents
much as they determine the success of a commercial product. Such considerations are
obviously beyond the scope of this discussion, but ought to be recognized as bearing upon
the general issue of how far the professions can realistically be said to behave like traditional
commercial enterprises.
30
See Hatley v. American Quarterhorse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 19TI) (rule of
association limiting amount of white on horses eligible for registration with the Association
held to be a legitimate tool in the Association's efforts to improve the breed and not in
contravention of rule of reason); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972) (exclusion of plaintiff from listings circulated
with defendant tour association's member airlines was justified where tour operator was not
authorized to represent certain tourists concerns in the listings); Marjorie Webster Jr.
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (exclusion of proprietary college from associa-
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decisions is that the restraints were a byproduct of the legitimate exercise
of self-regulatory powers designed to promote the purposes of the given
association. 31 To a lesser extent, several recent decisions involving organized sports demonstrate a similar tendency; the courts pulled back
from strict per se treatment when presented with the unique purposes of
those ventures. 32 Finally, courts have avoided the per se doctrine when

tion was not a group boycott since pursuant to a general policy applied evenhandedly to all
institutions seeking membership); Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 431 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978) (bid
procedure of Association found to be "little more restrictive than any number of other
administrative requirements which the general contractors might establish for themselves";
complaint alleging group boycott would not lie). But see Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n,
568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 19TI) (tour brokers committed per se violation by forming trade
association and thereafter working in concert to prevent their agents from obtaining ICC
tour broker licenses so as to prevent them from entering tour broker business); McCreery
Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1404
(7th Cir. 1974) (without opinion) (due process considerations give rise to finding of group
boycott).
31 In none of these cases, however, was the restrained party prevented from competing in
the marketplace. Where a competitor cannot perform services absent continued membership in a particular trade association, competition is clearly restrained and the anticompetitive effect is patent. Note that the group boycott definition includes practices that coerce
third parties as well as exclude. Hence a trade association rule or practice which coerces the
behavior of competitors will be deemed per se illegal. On the conceptual difficulty of
distinguishing between a rule which coerces and one which merely regulates, compare
Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 152 N.J. Super. 100, 377 A.2d 791 (19TI)
(rule requiring brokers to join county board of realtors in order to become members of
board's multiple listing service held to be unreasonable restraint) with Barrows v. Grand
Rapids Real Estate Bd., 51 Mich. App. 75, 214 N.W.2d 532 (1974) (failure of real estate
board to grant nonmembers access to multiple listing service operated for members held
unreasonable).
32
The leading decision favoring use of a rule of reason in antitrust litigation involving
sports enterprises is Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), in
which the circuit court reversed a lower court finding of per se group boycott in the League's
exclusion of plaintiff under the so-called Rozelle Rule, which allowed NFL clubs to sign free
agents only if able to reach an agreement with the player's former team as to compensation.
The circuit court suggested that the case "presents unusual circumstances rendering it
inappropriate to declare the Rozelle Rule illegal per se without undertaking an inquiry into
the purported justifications for the Rule." Id. at 619. The court went on to conclude that the
rule was significantly more restrictive than necessary to achieve the legitimate purposes for
the rule claimed by the league. As to the doctrine of "less restrictive means," see text
accompanying notes 70-81 infra. Accord, Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Alexander v. National Football League, [1977-2] TRADE CAs.
(CCH) ,i 61,730 (D.Minn. 1977); Erie Buffalo Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F.
Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1975); Kapp. v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, [1975-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 60,lll7 (D.N.J. 1974), afj'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3rd Cir. 1974) (without
opinion). But see Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
Notwithstanding the decision in Mackey, a number of courts have applied a test of per se
illegality to the group boycott question in organized sports. The leading decision is undoubtedly Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971), in which professional basketball's four-year college rule was
successfully challenged as a per se group boycott on the grounds that it excluded players
from the league without regard for special circumstances of individual players. Relying
principally on Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the district court
concluded that the failure to provide a hearing for the excluded athlete would preclude
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confronted with nonexempt labor activities, opting instead for the more
flexible balancing approach possible under the rule of reason. 33
Viewed broadly, the trade association and sports cases reflect the
willingness of many modem courts to consider the noncommercial purposes of group conduct in assessing the conduct's anticompetitive impact.
Recognition of a noncommercial purpose does not, however, necessarily
render the conduct legal. Rather, it acts as a procedural touchstone from
which a finding of reasonableness may eventually spring. The chief function of a noncommercial purpose is to expand the scope of the proceedings, thus avoiding a per se finding and allowing proof of reasonableness.
B. Noncommercial Purpose Applied to the Professions

It is but a short step from trade associations and organized sports to the
professions, which not only embody more classic noncommercial purposes, but also exert far more extensive self-regulatory powers. As with
trade associations, it is in the area of group boycott that the inadequacy of
strict per se treatment of professions is most readily apparent. To constitute a per se invalid group boycott, collective action must conform to the
definition of group boycott that has been generated by the courts. The
essential requirement of that definition is that the group activity manifest
an anticompetitive purpose. 34 Collective conduct that has been undertak-

inquiry into reasonableness. Denver Rockets has recently been followed in Linseman v.
World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 19TI). An analysis of player discipline
may be found in Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18
WM. & MARY L. REv. 703 (1977). See also Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An
Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655 (1978). For a discussion of the Silver rule, see text
accompanying notes 70-81 infra.
33
See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., [1978]
ANTITRUST & TRAD REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at E-7 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 1978): "In this
context, a finding of per se antitrust liability seems fundamentally at odds with the Supreme
Court's decision indicating that the policies of the antitrust acts must be balanced against
those reflected in the labor laws.'' The court goes on to note the trend away from per se rules
generally. See also Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d.
Cir. 1977); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Part of History, 40ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1971).
34
See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarterhorse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 19n); E.A.
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n,
446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League,
Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1%9), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied. 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Chastain v. AT&T, 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Dalmo
Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1970),
afj'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A leading commentator has distinguished between
collective action ''intended to coerce conduct of third parties or to secure their removal from
competition" from group conduct that involves "the acceptance of limitations on individual
freedom to deal not intended to coerce action by third parties or to secure their removal from
the market." See Barber, supra note 5, at 872-79. In the latter case, the group conduct would
avoid per se treatment because of the lack of anticompetitive purpose. Note that this
definition requires more than a general intent to do the act and to bring about the foreseeable
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en for a valid noncommercial purpose arguably falls outside the definition because the activity lacks the essential anticompetitive animus upon
which a finding of group boycott depends. Consequently, courts should
not presume anticompetitive intent and condemn the activity as per se
unreasonable where the professional defendant can show that the conduct
was undertaken for an arguably valid self-regulatory or otherwise noncommercial purpose.
This article proposes a three-pronged test to determine whether certain
professional conduct alleged to have been undertaken for noncommercial
purposes should be excepted from per se treatment. The first requirement
for such an exception is that the conduct arguably fall within the legitimate self-regulatory powers of the profession. If a professional society
seeks to exclude an individual from practice on the basis of his religious
beliefs, for example, it is doubtful that a court will permit such an action
because it involves self-regulation, even though those religious beliefs in
fact damage the profession and the restraints are motivated by fears of
such damage. 35 However, conduct arguably authorized by a profession's
legislative mandate should satisfy this requirement.
Secondly, the conduct must not primarily serve a predominantly
profit-oriented or commercial purpose of the particular profession. The
group boycott cases which follow suggest that refusals to deal that do not
serve some bona fide noncommercial function should still be subject to per
se treatment if the requisite anticompetitive purpose under the group
boycott definition is also shown. Such an inference may be gathered from
Goldfarb and its progeny, which indicate that some activities by professions, such as price-fixing, simply are devoid of any noncommercial
purpose. 36

consequences of that act. Anticompetitive "purpose" is therefore to be interpreted as
"motive" rather than mere "intent." See also note 6 supra.
35
Many states empower the professions they regulate to refuse admission to or take
disciplinary measures against persons who have engaged in conduct involving moral turpitude or simply immorality. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 1680 (1970); MICH. ST.
BAR GRIEVANCE Bo. R. 16.18. However, courts have limited the extent to which the
professions may exercise such powers. Se_e Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957);
Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 110 Cal. Reptr. 15, 514 P.2d 967
(1973).
36
Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the Supreme Court in Goldfarb was not
applying a per se rule to the price-fixing arrangement in that case, and at least one federal
court has so concluded. See United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Engr's, 404 F. Supp.
457 (D.D.C. 1975), a.ff d, 46 U .S.L. W. 4356 (1978). In oral argument before the Court in
Goldfarb, Solicitor General Bork in fact pointed up the commercial-noncommercial
dichotomy: "One searches in vain for any connection between professional ethics and
price-fixing, and one searches in vain for the principle that price-fixing is ethical.,-, 43
U.S.L.W. 3521, 3522 (1975).
It is arguable, at least, that the Court's subsequent finding of classic price-fixing reflects
an application of the per se test.exclusively to commercial activity of the professional
association. As the Court itself observed, "It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a
profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect." 421 U.S. at 788. Similarly, one
pre-Goldfarb court concluded, "[t]here is no more commercial element to the practice of
law than the setting of fees. Thus, even the acceptance by this Court of the exemption of
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Finally, the conduct must be undertaken in good faith, a test that
focuses upon the reasonable man 37 in the position of the professional
defendant. In effect, the good faith test looks to the timing and sequence
of events both leading up to and following the defendant's imposition of
the particular restraint.
Analysis under this test begins with the problem of ascertaining the
limits of a profession's powers of self-regulation. One approach for determining the proper scope of a profession's self-regulatory powers is to
grant an exception to the group boycott per se rule where the industry
structure requires self-regulation and where the collective action is essential to that self-regulation. 38 This approach would recognize selfregulatory powers beyond those reflected in a specific legislative
scheme. 39 The "essentiality" test, however, simply does not adequately
define what conduct is arguably valid self-regulation. On the one hand,
self-regulatory power should not be limited to a narrow "but for" test of
essentiality. On the other hand, self-regulatory powers having only a
tenuous connection with delivery of professional services should not
escape per se treatment simply because the relevant professional society
finds the collective action to have some indirect effect upon professional
practice. Moreover, proponents of the per se doctrine also have questioned whether any conduct the purpose of which can be achieved by less
restrictive means should ever be valid self-regulation.

noncommercial professional activities from the Sherman Act would not save defendant's fee
schedules." United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507, 517 (D. Ore. 1974). See
also Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, [1977-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,274
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
A current perception that a particular professional activity is a valid self-regulatory tool is
no guarantee that the activity will be insulated from antitrust challenge. Before Goldfarb,
minimum fee schedules were widely considered to be valid means of avoiding the evils of
price competition among professionals and of maintaining the integrity of the profession as a
whole. Similarly, advertising by professionals had been considered degrading to the professions, and professional societies commonly enjoined such activities. Judging from Bates v.
Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court appears not to have been persuaded by
that argument. Bates and Goldfarb at least suggest that the line between legitimate noncommercial activity and illegal anticompetitive activity can be very fine.
37
See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258,
1270 (N.D. Fla. 1976): "[T]he dictates and policies of the antitrust laws require that the
standard be an objective one. That is, the test of good faith is whether or not a reasonable
man in a position of the defendants would have acted as they did under the circumstances.''
38
See Bird, supra note 11, at 291.
39
Such a liberal interpretation of the extent of legitimate self-regulation stems in part from
language in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) that suggests a more
flexible standard where the justification for the alleged per se conduct derives from a
legislative mandate "or otherwise." Id. at 348-49. Just exactly what that phrase was
intended to encompass is not clear. For one interpretation, see Note, Trade Association
Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 CoLUM. L. REv.
1486, 1499 (1966) (includes justifications derived from "the need for self-regulation inherent
in the industry"). The lack of specific governmental regulation of the professions, such as
the SEC provides for the securities exchanges, has troubled more than a few commentators.
See Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 706 (1974) ("The alternative to a per se rule is to leave the
initial determination in the hands of private parties whose own self-interest will produce an
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The proper test of whether a given professional activity is arguably
valid self-regulation should be whether the conduct is germane to the
purposes of the profession's self-regulatory mandate. To an extent, this is
simply a common sense inquiry. Whatever verbal formula is employed,
any definition of the legitimate limits of self-regulation must take into
account the fact that the crucial issues, as in most antitrust litigation, are
most often factual. Whether a per se rule is properly applied to particular
professional group conduct will be determined largely by how the trial
court views the alleged justifications in connection with the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct: the character of the defendant,
the nature of the restraint, and the probability that the defendant association acted in conformity with its stated purposes. No rule of law can tell
the trial court whether a particular activity is somehow necessary for
self-regulation. The rule of reason has traditionally accorded trial courts
substantial deference in the arduous task of harmonizing new and as yet
unchallenged means of doing business with the competition policy of the
Sherman Act. Moreover, most states have codified the concept of selfregulation in the form of broad statutory powers conferred upon the
specific professions. These enabling statutes generally have not attempted to outline the precise powers and duties of the various professional
societies, but have left it to the professions themselves to define and
enforce the applicable standards. 4 ° Consequently, if the profession can

undesirable tendency to overvalue the alleged economic justifications and undervalue competition."); Raynack, Restrictive Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
659 (1968) ("[l]here arises the possibility of an internal contradiction in the dual role of the
professional organization as protector of society's welfare through the regulation of quality
and as defender of the economic interests of the members of the organization."). See also
Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Noncommercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 333-34 (1972).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of professional self-regulation and whether a mandate of self-regulation impliedly repeals the Sherman Act as to that particular self-regulated
industry, see, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock
Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). The question here is
the far less drastic one of whether the trial court is to hear evidence as to the reasonableness
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct. The fear expressed in the "implied repeal" cases
that the competing jurisdiction of a governmental agency may prove inadequate in
safeguarding the public interest simply does not arise where the jurisdiction of the antitrust
trial court is not at issue.
0
• See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW§ 1406(d)(l970):
It shall be lawful for any county medical society in this state ... to establish such
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for the government of its members as such county society may deem fit, provided such action
receives the sanction of the state medical society in which such county medical
society is represented ....

See also CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 1680(West Supp. 1978) (dentistry); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 2-114 (West 1969) (dentistry); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 458.1201 (West Supp. 1977)
(medicine); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 326.130 (Vernon 1966) (accountants); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 45: 12-11 (West 1978) (optometry).
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establish an arguable nexus between its statutory mandate and the challenged action, the conduct ought to be regarded as self-regulatory.
A recent decision illustrates how this first test might be approached. In
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association, 41 an Arizona dentist
brought suit against a local dental association on grounds that conditioning participation in its programs upon membership in the related national
association was a per se illegal tying arrangement. The dentist alleged that
the membership requirement merely furthered the monopoly of the national association and harmed nonmember local practitioners who might
otherwise take advantage of the local association's programs. 42 The local
association argued that the membership requirement was designed to
promote the improvement of dental services through the funding and
administration of dental aptitude tests, accreditation of dental programs,
and publication and dissemination of professional journals. 43 The district
court granted the local association's motion to dismiss on the ground that
the conduct fell within the learned profession exemption. While reversing
the district court on that point, the appellate court nevertheless intimated
that the doctrine of noncommercial purpose could save the membership
requirement, and that the association would be allowed at trial to prove
facts in justification of the conduct:
As we interpret the Court [in Goldfarb], to survive a Sherman
Act challenge a particular practice, rule or regulation of a particular profession, whether rooted in tradition or the pronouncements of its organizations, must serve the purpose for
which the profession exists, viz . .. it must contribute directly to
improving services to the public. Those which only suppress
competition between practitioners will fail to survive the challenge. This interpretation permits a harmonization of the ends
that both the professions and the Sherman Act serve. 44
The restraint involved in Boddicker is not unlike many trade association
restraints: it applies uniformly to all members and is designed to further a
fundamental noncommercial purpose of the association. Moreover, the
dual membership requirement is essential in making the various dental
programs possible. Establishing programs to improve standards of practice is within the power of the local societies. The dual membership
requirement is arguably a necessary adjunct to that power and consequently falls within the scope of the profession's self-regulatory mandate. Most importantly, the closeness of the question in Boddicker,
whether the membership requirement furthered a bona fide noncommer-

549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3189 (1977).
549 F.2d at 629. Actually, plaintiff argued alternatively that expulsion from the local
societies for failure to pay the ADA membership dues would impair his ability to practice
dentistry, and on the other hand that he would receive no benefit from dues paid to the
ADA.
43
Id. at 633.
44
Id. at 632 (footnote omitted).
41

42
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cial purpose of the association, suggests that the restraint is at least not so
unambiguously anticompetitive as to warrant application of a per se rule.
Under the second prong of the proposed test, the profession's primary
purpose for its activity must be noncommercial if it is to avoid per se
treatment. The critical question is whether trial courts can distinguish
between c~nduct satisfying a legitimate noncommercial function and conduct having an anticompetitive purpose. In United States Dental Institute
v. American Association of Orthodontists, 45 for example, the USDI, a
private, profitmaking educational institution providing postsecondary
education in orthodontia, alleged that the defendant association had engaged in a group boycott by preventing practicing dentists otherwise
unable to attain the requisite skills to practice orthodontia from participating in the USDI's educational programs. In effect, the USDI claimed that
by refusing to recognize its programs the Association sought only to
preserve its monopoly in the practice of orthodontia. 46 The AAO defended on the grounds that it was acting to protect general practitioner
dentists from the alleged substandard educational programs provided by
the USDI.
As already suggested, accreditation of educational programs is a jealously guarded self-regulatory function directly affecting the standards of
practice among practitioners. 47 Since the AAO has the power to establish
educational standards for its members, the first element of the proposed
test would be satisfied. Admittedly, however, the fact that the restraint
directly inhibits nonspecialists from competing in the market for orthodontic services makes the asserted noncommercial purpose somewhat
more problematic than the situation in Boddicker. Unless the AAO can
also prove that the goal of its conduct was predominantly noncommercial,
and thus satisfy the second element of the test, application of a rule of
reason would be inappropriate. To prove a primary noncommercial purpose, the AAO would first have to show that the dental education offered
by the USDI is, in fact, substandard in comparison with the established
standards of the orthodontic profession generally. Second, it would have
to substantiate its claimed noncommercial purpose by means of correspondence, complaints against the Institute, and the like, and perhaps by
emphasizing the proprietary nature of the USD I. 48 Demonstrating that the
USDI does not pose a significant economic threat to the AAO members

45

396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
Specifically, the USDI charged that the AAO acted improperly when it acted to have
the school's license revoked, declared it unethical for a dentist to teach at the school,
refused to publish listings of the school's journals in defendant's publication, and removed
plaintiff from defendant's list of approved schools. Id. at 569.
47
See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
48
Tactically, emphasis upon the US Di's proprietary interest might induce the trier of fact
to conclude that the USDI was challenging the AAO's actions for more selfish reasons than
the desire to increase access to the practice of orthodontia. Needless to say, this tactic
· requires that the AAO have a reasonable basis for attacking the USDI on ihose grounds.
46
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would help substantiate that claim. 49 If it appears that the claimed noncommercial purpose is nonexistent, or merely ancillary to a commercial
purpose, then the conduct should not be sustained under the noncommercial purpose doctrine. This burden of proof avoids the potential injustice
under the proposed test that might result from mechanical yet difficult to
disprove assertions of noncommercial purpose.
Finally, the proposed test requires that the conduct be undertaken in
good faith as a reasonable response to a situation requiring professional
self-regulation. Inquiry into good faith is neither as subjective nor unfocussed as some commentators fear. A useful example of the kind of
inquiry into good faith that a court should undertake is suggested by
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad. 50 There, the trial
court was asked to determine whether the services provided by a local
health clinic to its abortion patients were adequate, and, if inadequate,
whether local physicians were justified in withdrawing their services from
the clinic and discouraging nonlocal physicians from performing abortions
there. 51 The clinic alleged in its motion for preliminary injunction that the
physicians' motive was to destroy the clinic's abortion services, which
were significantly lower in cost than those offered by private physicians
and therefore posed an economic threat to those practitioners. 52 The
court held that the defendants' good faith could be a defense to the
allegation of anticompetitive conduct. Although the court denied the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, 53 it also found that the
defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that they acted in
good faith.
The Mohammad court looked particularly at the timing and sequence of
events, especially the fact that the withdrawal of services came shortly
after a newspaper article comparing the cost of abortions at the clinic with
th_ose performed by local physicians. 54 Also, initial discussions among the
defendant physicians concerning the clinic took place before defendants
knew whether adequate care was in fact available. Finally, no clear
standards for the allegedly substandard services had crystallized within

49
It would be useful, for example, to show that the AAO had taken similar action against
substandard educational programs without any resulting antitrust challenge. A presumption
of regularity would thus defeat the assumption that the AAO was motivated by vindictiveness or fear of upsetting the economic status quo.
0
•
415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
5 1 Suit was brought against a group of physicians for conduct undertaken in their
capacities as private practitioners. The state medical society was never involved in the
boycott. One physician was absolved by the trial court of any wrongdoing. No liability was
assessed against the remaining physicians because the court was responding to a motion for
preliminary injunction.
52
According to an article published shortly before the restraint was instituted by the
defendant physicians, the cost of an abortion at the Center was $150, compared to $400 if
performed privately. Id. at 1264.
53 The court denied the injunction because the plaintiff failed to prove a sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm. Id. at 1271.
54
Interestingly, the district court found that the Center was operating "without substantial controversy" before the article appeared. Id. at 1269.
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the medical community, and the defendants had not inquired very deeply
into the nature of those services before instituting the restraint. 55 Inasmuch as the district court was responding to a motion for preliminary
injunction, its inquiry into noncommercial purpose was necessarily limited. Nevertheless, the evidence indicated a substantial likelihood that the
Center would be successful on the merits. 56
The proposed test differs in one significant respect from the test recently propounded in Linseman v. World Hockey Association 51 which
would exempt conduct from the group boycott per se rule if ( 1) there is a
legislative mandate for self-regulation, (2) there is collective action intended to accomplish a goal consistent with the policy justifying selfregulation and related to that goal, and,(3) there are procedural safeguards
to prevent arbitrariness and furnish a basis for judicial review. 58 The test
proposed by this article substitutes a good faith test for the requirement of
procedural safeguards, because the latter test is simply inconsistent with
the theoretical underpinnings of the per se doctrine. 59 Furthermore, the

•• The physicians had initially attacked the Center on the grounds that its advertising of
abortion services was unethical. As to this charge, the district court similarly found that the
physicians had not sought legal advice as to the propriety of such advertising before taking
action against the Center. Id. at 1270.
56
The district court also refused to find that the conduct was exempt on grounds of either
the state action or Noerr-Pennington exemptions to the Sherman Act. See note 3 supra.
While Mohammad thus offers a good example of the kind of practical inquiry that a trial
court must make, the decision is marred by the court's confused use of the basic per se
vocabulary. For example, the court stated initially that it would apply a per se rule to the
alleged group boycott, to the extent that it would not require plaintiffs to prove that the
conduct was unreasonable or that public harm had resulted. Had the court properly applied
the doctrine of per se illegality, its analysis should have stopped there. However, the court
went on to entertain defendants' good faith defense to plaintiff's "prima facie" per se case. Id.
at 1263. While preserving the per se label, then, the court effectively converted the per se
doctrine into a mere burden of proof issue. This is in keeping with the court's earlier
assertion that "in the professional context the application of historic antitrust doctrines may
be somewhat different from the application of those doctrines in purely commercial settings." Id. While the court in so doing may have done a disservice to the per se doctrine, the
result-allowing the noncommercial purpose to be scrutinized according to an implicit rule
of reason test-was proper in view of the apparent closeness of the issue as to whether the
collective action was taken out of regard for the quality of aftercare services at the Center.
A final lesson to be drawn from Mohammad concerns the ability of trial courts to
·determine standards of practice in a given profession. As the court candidly admitted,
"[t]here is considerable difference of medical opinion within the medical community as to
the meaning, interpretation and coercive effect of medical standards relied upon by the
doctors who are defendants here." Id. at 1270. As in USDI, the standards of practice at
issue in Mohammad are matters peculiarly within the expertise of the medical profession.
The administrative cost of having trial courts resolve such disputes over professional
standards might be intolerable; imposition of a per se rule could have a chilling effect upon
prQfessional societies, and fear of per se liability might cause a shifting of the burden of
regulation onto the courts. The obvious drawbacks of such a system of dispute resolution
command that the rule of reason be applied in those cases where the self-regulatory nature of
the conduct is arguably within the expertise of the profession.
57 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). The test invoked by the district court was originally
used in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
•• 439 F. Supp. at 1321.
•• For a discussion of the relationship between procedural safeguards and the theory of
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good faith test avoids summary condemnation of defendants under the
antitrust laws for having engaged in conduct that, while failing to provide
procedural safeguards, nevertheless responds to a specified selfregulatory need. 60
Once a court has decided to apply a rule of reason, it must determine
how such an ad hoc determination should proceed. In situations like
Boddicker, for example, whether the public service aspect of the conduct
justifies the restraint depends upon the association's ability to substantiate its claim that the membership requirement contributes directly to the
improvement of professional services. The importance of the Boddicker
case, however, is not whether the restraint is ultimately deemed reasonable. The court's decision is significant for its recognition of this public
service aspect as a special factor calling for a different analysis in applying
the rule of reason than that reserved for traditional antitrust defendants.
This analysis allows courts to offset the greater anticompetitive effect of
certain professional practices by the correspondingly greater public interest value of the particular restraint. In view of the substantial public
interest values associated with the challenged membership requirement,
such analysis best accommodates the conflicting interests of the antitrust
laws and the dental profession.
Applying the analysis suggested by the Boddicker case to the facts
appearing in the opinion, 61 several arguments favoring the reasonableness
of the membership requirement can be made. First, if the funds generated
by the membership requirement were allocated to various dental programs as asserted, then participation in the local programs without payment to the national association may give nonparticipating dentists a free
ride with respect to the local programs. At the very least, such use of the
funds belies the argument that the arrangement is intended merely to
strengthen the hegemony of the national association. Secondly, although
the membership requirement affects the individual dentist economically,
the crucial variable in the court's antitrust calculus should have been the
public welfare: if the dental programs were rationally related to the
consumers' need for improved dental services, the mandatory nature of
the membership requirement should not trouble the court. Indeed, the
membership cost will probably be passed on to the consumers. 62
The alternative to the balancing approach suggested here is potentially
a harsh one: the per se doctrine disregards possible benefits flowing to the
public and might subject the local association to treble damage liability. 63

per se illegality, see text accompanying notes 70--81 infra.
60 But see Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices, supra note 39.
61
See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
62 Arguably the potential rise in the cost of dental services is _the real anticompetitive
effect. Therefore, in the course of the balancing approach proposed by this article, the trial
court should ask whether the increment in the cost of professional services is justified by the
asserted benefits flowing to consumers from the programs administered by the national
association.
63
Consider, for example, the brief submitted to the Supreme Court in United States v.
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The per se doctrine is grounded in the notion that certain practices must
be dealt with strongly because of their pernicious effect upon competitive
relations. Restraints like those inBoddicker, however, are designed not to
alter competitive relations but to raise standards of practice among dental
practitioners. Indeed, the complaining dentists in Boddicker remained
free to compete in the market for dental services. 64
In cases like USDJ, application of a per se rule would similarly overlook the potential harms to the profession and the public arising from the
possibly substandard education offered by the USDI. The asserted noncommercial purpose should be weighed in the balance particularly since
the standards of practice out of which the restraint grew are so much
within the expertise of the particular profession or specialization. Resorting to a per se rule in situations like USDI would in effect rewrite the
Sherman Act: a newly created educational institution could claim the
right, according to a somewhat strained interpretation of the competition
policy of the Act, to impose its own standards of practice upon an
important profession and to collect treble damages where the primary
right is violated. Clearly the Act was not intended to stand for such a
proposition.
Applicat.ion of a rule of reason does not necessarily constitute a
windfall to the professional association. In a situation like USDI, 65 for
example, a rule of reason will take into account whether the alleged abuse
of educational standards could have been dealt with by less restrictive
means. In effect, the court dealing with the professional defendant must
ask whether there is some redeeming virtue in the collective action that
outweighs.the harm to members of a particular profession and, more
importantly, to the public. The key to this balancing process, as the
Boddicker court suggests, ought to be the public interest. Where professional conduct is ''highly regulated by the state, and intimately concerns
the public health and welfare, " 66 the rule of reason "best balances the
policies of the antitrust laws with the public welfare burden" 67 borne by
the professions. 68

National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs. The Society argued that its ban on competitive bidding was
"indispensable to public safety and health," in that problems in engineering precluded
realistic estimates on a particular job without the benefit of various reports and studies.
Thus, the Society concluded that the imposition of a per se rule by the lower courts in that
case had elevated "judicial administration to a higher priority than public safety." See
[1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at A-16.
64
Again, a different situation might arise if a physician were prevented from using local
hospital facilities essential to his practice because of his refusal to join a national association.
A rule of reason analysis would be unlikely to uncover a sufficient policy justification for the
exclusion to offset the competition policy embodied in the Sherman Act.
65
See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
66
Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. at 1263.
61 Id.
88
The recent experience in Michigan of an attempt by the Michigan State Medical Society
to boycott Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the state's largest health insurer, is a telling
example of the dangers inherent in overreliance upon per se rules. The Society, a state
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C. Challenges to a Rule of Reason
for the Professions
Notwithstanding the substantive arguments against applying per se
rules to the narrow range of professional activities satisfying the proposed
test, courts and commentators have raised several criticisms of the rule of
reason. These criticisms focus mainly upon the procedural difficulties of
applying a rule of reason to the conduct embraced by the test and suggest
that the administrative burdens would prove intolerable. For reasons
discussed below, these fears appear to be largely illusory and point up the
confusion that has characterized the courts' approaches to the use of per
se rules.
Critics of the rule of reason argue that the timesaving benefits of per se
rules will be lost by having courts hear evidence on noncommercial
purpose since trial courts must first determine in plenary proceedings
whether a particular practice somehow relates to some legitimate selfregulatory goal. 69 Following the lead set by Justice Goldberg in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 70 several courts have required that organizations excluding a third party in the name of self-regulation observe certain
procedural safeguards in order to furnish a basis for judicial review and to
prevent arbitrariness. 71 Silver involved the termination by the Exchange
of a nonmember's wire service in the belief that the broker-dealer had
engaged in various abuses of the over-the-counter market. 72 The reason
for the termination was never communicated to the excluded trader, and
no hearing was provided for him to respond to the undisclosed charges.
The Supreme Court held that, while section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act 73 mandated the Exchange to regulate the conduct of its members and

physician group, resolved to boycott a plan instituted by "the Blues" to sign up physicians
for a new scheme of reimbursement for services, the effect of which is to enable participating physicians to earn substantially more than nonparticipating physicians. The Society
opposes the plan because it is an unacceptable extension of control over the practice of
physicians by "the Blues." Whether or not the Society's fears are valid-and following from
that, whether or not the collective action was a legitimate exercise of the profession's
self-regulatory powers-involves a complex range of economic and social issues that are
best resolved in full plenary proceedings. If the insurer's plan results in a deepening schism
between participating and nonparticipating physicians, the scheme might well engage the
strong concern of the Society. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 27, 1977, at IA, col. 4; Id., Oct.
29, 1977, at 3A col. 2.
69
As ordinarily employed, a per se rule would exclude evidence of reasonableness
altogether. Although the proposed test would allow such evidence to come before the court,
it would not be necessary to consume trial time in order to review these proofs. See text
accompanying note 81 infra.
10
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
71 See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
stay vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
72
The abuses mentioned included plaintiff's failure to disclose his and his wife's connections with various enterprises, the fact that plaintiff's security clearance with the Defense
Department had been revoked, and reports of general untrustworthiness and unreliability.
See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1962).
7
3 15 u.s.c. § 78(f) (1970).
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impliedly that of nonmembers with whom members necessarily deal in the
over-the-counter market, the Exchange's failure to provide adequate
procedural safeguards, without more, rendered its conduct unreasonable.
The primary justification given by Justice Goldberg was that termination
of a broker-dealer's wire service without notice or hearing provides no
mechanism to check arbitrary exclusions by the Exchange. A second
justification was that lack of a hearing and consequential absence of a
record make it virtually impossible for courts to determine whether a per
se rule should apply at the onset without engaging in possibly protracted
and unnecessary factfinding. According to Silver, a hearing requirement
gives the trial court the alternative of looking to the hearing record in
making its initial determination. 74
A hearing requirement is an unacceptable solution to the problem of
providing the court with a basis for imposing a per se rule because the
record generated by a private hearing may itself lack procedural
safeguards. Unlike a court oflaw, a hearing is not likely to have a binding
effect upon the parties and provides none of the discovery devices that
often prove decisive in the antitrust context. In practice, an excluded
party will seldom rest content with the suspect conclusion of an in-house
panel that the exclusion was for a noncommercial purpose and therefore
justified. Even a formal hearing will be hampered by an inability to get the
facts out. Courts may ultimately find themselves policing the fairness' of
such hearings, thus swapping one administrative burden for another. 75
The hearing required by Silver is also an unacceptable solution to the
problem of arbitrariness. As Silver has been interpreted by the courts,
lack of procedural safeguards is ipso facto unreasonable under the Sherman Act. 76 This interpretation is perhaps intended to reflect the doctrine
of less restrictive means, which focuses upon the antitrust defendant's
ability to achieve its declared noncommercial purpose by some less restrictive course of action. A hearing, therefore, would constitute the less
restrictive means in the Silver example. By equating the lack of procedural safeguards with a finding of unreasonableness, however, the

1

•

75

373 U.S. at 362.
If, as some commentators suggest, the hearing requirement is really a kind of unwritten

confrontation clause, such a confrontation is likely to be "full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing." Complainants the size of the USDI or Blue Cross will inevitably press their claims
in court despite an adverse outcome at the hearing. Of course, antitrust complainants should
not be subjected to the costs of litigation where a simple hearing or arbitration would suffice.
Indeed, the desirability of self-regulation is based in part upon a need to relieve the courts of
the burden of regulating the professions themselves. Ultimately, however, these institutional confrontations are going to wind up in the courts, and while litigiousness should not be
encouraged, there is some sense in having the antitrust laws administered in courts of law
rather than in isolated conference rooms.
76
See, e.g., Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977).
Ironically, Silver has also been read to say that a court may pull back from per se treatment,
even though there is no express statutory mandate of self-regulation, when faced with some
justification presented by the circumstances surrounding the conduct in question. In effect,
this latter interpretation merely restates the traditional rule of reason. See, e.g., Note, Trade
Association Exclusionary Practices, supra note 39, at 1500: "An identifiable public policy
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Silver court inflated the theory of per se illegality to constitutional dimensions by engrafting concepts of due process onto the Sherman Act and
subjecting antitrust defendants to treble damage liability for conduct that
has not been proven anticompetitive.
Courts following the Silver rationale have sometimes spoken of a rule of
reason exception to per se illegality where the conduct has been undertaken with the requisite procedural safeguards. 77 Not only does this stand
traditional antitrust analysis on its head, but, like Silver, penalizes the
defendant who has arguably acted in good faith to deal with a particular
abuse. The premise of per se illegality is that the proscribed conduct is
clearly anticompetitive; yet in applying a per se test due to lack of a
hearing, a court does not even reach the substance of the restraint. The
better view is that lack of procedural safeguards should be relevant but
not dispositive. 78 As Justice Stewart asserts in his dissent to Silver,
"[t]here might be cases in which the public interest would demand that at
least preliminary disciplinary action be taken with swift effectiveness. " 79
As he understands the majority opinion, the Exchange's exclusion without a hearing could not be defended by showing that the plaintiff was an
unmitigated swindler, even if proof of that fact were available to an
absolute certainty. He concludes that the Securities Exchange Act should
be interpreted to remove antitrust liability for actions taken in good faith
to effectuate an exchange's statutory duty of self-regulation. While this
article does not adopt Justice Stewart's position that the Exchange Act
impliedly repealed the Sherman Act with respect to such self-regulatory
practices, it does contend that good faith self-regulatory conduct should
receive more favorable consideration by the courts than the per se doctrine allows. 80 The mainspring of the per se mechanism is not whether the

favoring industry self-regulation need not, under the Silver rationale, find its inspiration in a
statute, state or federal." The author nevertheless upholds Justice Goldberg's "safeguards"
analysis. The Silver court itself remarked, 373 U.S. at 360:
[nhe entire public policy of self-regulation, beginning with the idea that the
Exchange may set up barriers to membership, contemplates that the Exchange will
engage in restraints of trade which might well be unreasonable absent sanction by
the Securities Exchange Act .... Under the aegis of the rule of reason, traditional
antitrust concepts are flexible enough to permit the Exchange sufficient breathing
space within which to carry out the mandate of the Securities Exchange Act.
See also Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971): "[T]he Court [in Silver] concluded that the proper
approach is an analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes ... with
one another rather than holding one completely ousted."
77
Indeed, during oral argument in United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, Justice
Rehnquist discussed the rule of reason exception with counsel for petitioners. See [1978)
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 847 at A-20.
78
Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.26 1977, where the
majority notes that while the location restriction used by Sylvania was neither "[t]he least
nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used," nevertheless, "a per se rule
based on the nature of the restriction is, in general, undesirable."
79
373 U.S. at 368. See also Robinson, supra note 12, at 231.
80
Significantly, the Mohammad court chose to implement a good faith defense which
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defendant has done everything short of violating the Act, but whether the
activity complained of is on its face so typical of the evils the Sherman
Act was meant to proscribe that the court need not inquire any further.
Lack of notice or hearing simply does not respond to this latter inquiry.
The doctrine of less restrictive means discussed above responds to the
fear that, without strict due process requirements, professional societies
will never be held accountable for abuse of their self-regulatory mandate.
This fear is better alleviated by the traditional rule of reason, which errs
only to the extent that it calls for a more protracted inquiry, than by the
per se doctrine, which not only ignores defendant's justifications but
imposes harsh penalties for possibly reasonable self-regulatory conduct.
Moreover, applying the rule of reason need not be unusually burdensome:
a profession's justification can be spelled out with particularity in the
pleadings, supported by data, affidavits, or exhibits substantiating the
claimed noncommercial purpose. Through discovery, the party alleging
the group boycott can muster opposing evidence. Upon some minimum
showing, the trial judge can make a pretrial determination that the rule of
reason ought to apply. By this means, the expense of trying frivolous or
bad faith claims of noncommercial purpose can be avoided. 81
Some commentators fear that under the approach advanced by this
article trial courts will abuse their discretion in finding that particular
group conduct was or was not prosecuted for self-regulatory or noncommercial reasons. They also make the broader criticism that trial courts are
simply not competent to deal with the complex business and economic

does not require a hearing. See note 37 supra.
[11he very purpose of an exchange is to exclude nonmembers from participation in
trading. Were it not for the legislative authorization of such exchanges, they would
constitute group boycotts that are per se violations of the Sherman
Act .... Thus .... some accommodation must be reached between usual antitrust principles and the self-regulatory and exclusionary powers that the exchanges
were obviously intended to exercise.
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 314 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81
A recent example of the "fine line" analysis with which courts are likely to be
confronted involves a suit by a group of small and medium sized accounting firms against the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), charging that the selfregulatory changes adopted recently by the organization will decrease competition within
the accounting profession. Essentially, the changes create a new class of membership for
accounting firms, as opposed to individual accountants, with separate sections for firms
auditing publicly held and privately held corporations. Were the plaintiff firms, who are
seeking injunctive relief, to bring an antitrust action alleging group boycott, the AICPA
would have strong grounds for arguing that the changes, approved by the Institute's
governing council, serve a distinctly noncommercial purpose in seeking to establish procedures for a public oversight board, sanctions against derelict firms and mandatory peer
reviews. Indeed, it is maintained that the changes were made in response to congressional
criticism of the accounting profession concerning laxity in auditing certain corporate clients.
Conversely, since the changes were not subscribed to by the entire membership of the
association, smaller accounting firms might well charge that the changes are a disguised
power play on the part of the larger firms. At the very least, the situation suggests that there
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matters presented to the court under this standard. 82 Of course, appellate
review is available where the trial court clearly abuses its discretion,
although, as one court has observed in noting the trend away from the use
of per se rules, " 'the law in Washington ... is quite different from the law
in the rest of the country.' " 83 The competency issue is a two-edged
sword, because a trial court that is considered too incompetent to apply
the test proposed in this article ought to be considered equally incompetent to decide that certain conduct is clearly anticompetitive and therefore
per se illegal. 84 Regardless of their competency, trial courts are and will
continue to rule upon complex issues in the absence of legislative answers
to these problems. 85 In the meantime, the implementation of a per se rule,
which holds defendants liable for treble damages on the basis of greatly
abbreviated proceedings, is a high price for avoiding trial court consideration of the economic and social realities of a given industry or activity. 86
Proponents of the per se test argue that by allowing professions to raise
the argument of noncommercial purpose, the courts will invariably find
themselves faced with professional societies intoning the talismanic concept of self-regulation only as a means of extending and solidifying their
monopoly of the profession. 87 This bubble of suspicion surrounding professional activities is not easily burst. Moreover, from an administrative
standpoint, expanding the scope of judicial review might appear to give
professions an added weapon in their arsenal of dilatory tactics. However, the test proposed by this article expands the scope of proceedings

are sufficient indicia of good faith on the part of the AICPA to allow a trial court to entertain
a defense of noncommercial purpose if such an action were brought. See N .Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1978, at 02, col. I.
82
See, e.g., Bird, supra note 11, at 279: "The rule of reason approach would call upon
judges to decide cases based on nothing more convincing than their own set of values and
policy preferences which may or may not be shared by the public at large or their elected
representatives."
83
Cullum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418,
428 (D.S.C. 1976), affd, [1978-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) ,i 61,866 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting from
Wooley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws? 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 773,
774 (1974)).
84
Consider, for example, Professor Areeda 's observation that "judges and commentators
don't really understand antitrust. They deal with it at the level of jargon. Past the jargon, the
problem is a lack of consensus as to what does and does not pay off for the special good."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1976, at 43, col. 6.
85
Cf. Kauper, supra note 14, at 330 (in which Professor Kauper disparages the tendency
of trial courts to shun economic analyses). Another commentator has described the trial
judge's responsibility as "the awesome task of continually creating and recreating the
Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics and his conception of the requirements
of the judicial process." Bork, supra note 14, at 48.
86
Justice Stevens has recently cautioned that "the Court should adhere to its settled
policy of giving concrete meaning to the general language of the Sherman Act by a process of
case-by-case adjudication of specific controversies." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 603 (1975).
87
See Bird, supra note 11, at 281-82.
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only for those professional activities that carry sufficient indicia of validity. Use of this test therefore avoids the problem of courts granting the
professions too much deference.
In response to the suggested administrative problem, one discussion of
the group boycott cases has attempted to formulate an extremely precise
definition of "group boycott" that would serve as a flat rule for professional conduct. 88 It is more likely, however, that the courts will continue
to mark out the boundaries of group boycott on a case-by-case basis,
perhaps because of the general intractability of anticompetitive purposes
and effects. Initially, the costs of the test proposed by this article to
professional activities may be considerable. However, the advantages of
building a rational foundation for the application of per se rules to professional conduct, rather than importing the present rules of per se illegality
wholecloth are more substantial. As Justice Blackmun has commented in
another context:
No doubt such a rule of reason will crystallize, as it is applied,
into various per se rules relating to certain kinds of state enactments, such as the regulation of the classic monopoly, the public
utility. We should not shrink in our general approach, however,
from what seems to me our constitutionally mandated task, one
often set for us by conflicting federal and state laws, and that is
the balancing of implicated federal and state interests with a
view to assuring that when these are truly in conflict, the former
prevail. 89
The same care in balancing the policy goals of the Sherman Act against
state interests should be taken in the context of professional activities.
Professional services provide important benefits for consumers among
the states which could be jeopardized by overzealous use of the per se
formulae.
In cases not involving group boycott, application of rules of per se
illegality to certain professional activities may be desirable despite the
costs resulting for the public or the particular profession. Price-fixing,
tying arrangements, and other egregious activities should not escape per
se condemnation simply because they enjoy the respectability of having
been mandated by the ethical rules of a given profession. In these cases,
courts should not hesitate to pierce the veil of professional self-regulation
during their inquiries into noncommercial purpose.
Some guidance on this issue has been provided by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in United States v. National Society of Professional
Engineers, 90 a case involving alleged price-fixing in the form of an absolute ban against competitive bidding by members of the Society. In

88

See Note, Boycott: A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71
Nw. U.L. REv. 818 (1977).
89
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90
46 U.S.L.W. 4356 (1978), affg 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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affirming the district court's holding that the agreement constituted classic price-fixing, 91 the Court discounted the Society's contention that the
ban minimized the risk that competition would produce inferior engineering work and endanger the public safety, calling it a "fundamental misunderstanding" of the rule of reason. 92 In discussing the rule of reason, the
Court asserted that ''the inquiry mandated by the ·Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged· agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition. " 93 To the extent that the ban on competitive bidding clearly suppressed competition, the Court deemed the
agreement illegal "[o]n its face. " 94
It is not clear that the Court thereby intended to mean that the ban on
competitive bidding was a per se restraint. While the finding of illegality
"on its face" connotes per se condemnation, the Court throughout its
opinion speaks as though it was in fact undertaking the inquiry mandated
by the Rule of Reason mentioned above. Thus while the Court acknowledges the cautionary footnote in Goldfarb and expresses the view that
"professional services may differ significantly from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services
may vary, " 95 the Court seemingly departs from that liberal view by then
suggesting that only those professional practices that have no anticompetitive effect will be deemed to fall within the rule of reason. 96 While the
Court's language is certainly dictum, it suggests a retrenchment from the
more optimistic forecast of the Goldfarb Court that certain professional
restraints might be treated differently from traditional business practices.
As Justice Blackmun concludes in his concurring opinion, "I am not at all
certain that the Court leaves enough elbow room for realistic application
of the Sherman Act to professional services.' ' 97 A different case might be
presented if the bidding ban in NSPE was not such an absolute interdiction of price information and was' 'more closely confined to the legitimate
objective of preventing deceptively low bids. " 98 As the circuit court
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rejected the Society's contention that Goldfarb required application of the rule of reason.
404 F. Supp. at 460. The question presented to the Court on certiorari was whether the rule
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"have no anticompetitive effect and ... are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose
of protecting the public from harm or itself from product liability." Id. at n.22 (emphasis
added).
97
Id. at 4361.
98
555 F.2d at 983.

SPRING

1978)

Professions and Antitrust Law

415

concluded, "The issue is not one of mere semantics, it is one of accurate
identification of a rule having regard to its language, purpose and effect. " 99 In view of the similarity of the price-fixing charge in NSPE to that
in Goldfarb, it is not surprising that the Court chose not to use this case to
carve an exception for arguably self-regulatory conduct out of the normal
rules of per se illegality. The implications of some of the Court's language,
however, go well beyond the facts of this particular case. Whether the
Court's singular emphasis on competition in N SPE shall extend to all
forms of professional self-regulation is a matter of speculation. The Court
should attempt to illuminate further the commercial/noncommercial distinction it noted in Goldfarb with the aim of lending greater certainty to
self-regulatory practices currently engaged in by the professions.

CONCLUSION

Although no firm consensus exists as to the social and economic goals
of the Sherman Act, it is at least clear that per se rules arose out of the
courts' experience with commercial activities whose purposes and anticompetitive effects differ significantly from those of the professions.
The mechanical application of per se rules of illegality in the professional
setting contradicts the basic rule that only unreasonable restraints are
condemned by the Sherman Act. Since the courts are presently operating
without the benefit oflong experience with the professions in the antitrust
arena, the conclusions garnered from traditional commercial practices
should not be carried over unthinkingly to professional practices. The
delay between the formulation of the rule of reason and the later adoption
of the various per se rules reflects commendable caution on the part of the
courts not to engage in antitrust overkill. That same spirit of caution
should obtain where, as at present, enforcement of the antitrust laws is
being carried out against complex and changing industries.
This article provides an approach to professional activities that does
justice both to the theory of per se illegality under the Sherman Act and to
those noncommercial purposes that are intrinsic to a profession. The
proposed test is intended to provide a focus for determining whether
conduct engaged in by professionals should be excepted from the application of per se rules. Under that test, a per se rule would not be applied to
conduct that (1) is arguably within the self-regulatory powers of the given
profession, (2) serves a predominantly noncommercial purpose of the
profession, and (3) has been undertaken in good faith, that is, a reasonable
man in the position of the defendant would have undertaken similar
efforts at self-regulation under the circumstances. If the conduct is removed from the per se category, the public interest values served by the
conduct should be determined in order to judge whether the anticompeti-
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tive effect is outweighed by the benefits flowing to consumers of professional services.
Based upon the courts' experience with certain recurring professional
practices, various per se rules may eventually emerge under the approach
recommended by this article. However, until the "business and economic
stuff'' 100 of a given profession's activities have been reduced to predictable patterns, ad hoc determinations as to the appropriateness ofa claim of
noncommercial purpose are preferable to the unchecked extension of per
se rules into this new area of the courts' antitrust jurisdiction.
-Jonathan Cobb Dickey
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